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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES: 
WHAT ROLES FOR NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, 
AND HYBRID TRIBUNALS? 
REMARKS BY LAURA DICKINSON" 
The issue of accountability for atrocities has been a major source of debate in international 
human rights and humanitarian law. Over the past fifteen years, we have seen the proliferation 
of mechanisms used to impose accountability. In the process, at least two different important 
dichotomies have emerged: 
First, there has been debate about the types of accountability mechanisms, particularly where 
such mechanisms are located and how they are composed. Thus, we see a potential dichotomy 
between international forums such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTy) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on the one hand, and 
domestic forums on the other. 
Second, there has been concern about the goals ofthese accountability mechanisms: the pos-
sibility that the different types of mechanisms actually have different, perhaps even incom-
patible, aims. Thus there is perhaps a dichotomy between classic crimillal trials, with their focus 
on individual culpability, and other transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions, 
with their greater emphasis on broad historical truth-telling, or societal healing. 
More recently, both of these dichotomies have become blurred, raising a new set oftheo-
retical and practical issues. With regard to types of accountability mechanisms, we have seen 
the emergence of hybrids-courts that have both domestic and international actors, applying 
both domestic and international law, that are generally located in the country where the atroc-
ities took place. 
My own work has analyzed these hybrid courts with regard to their perceived legitimacy 
among both international and domestic constituencies; their ability to promote local capacity-
building in the justice sector; and the likelihood that the norms articulated in them will pene-
trate the local society and become part of the culture. I have argued that in some post-conflict 
settings, along each of these three dimensions, hybrid courts may be superior to, though not 
necessarily an alternative to, purely international or purely domestic courts. I 
With regard to the goals of the different mechanisms, scholars have increasingly emphasized 
the fact that each mechanism serves multiple goals. Trials, for example, may involve both indi-
vidual accountability, and broad historical truth-telling and societal reconciliation; likewise, 
truth commissions need not involve amnesty from criminal prosecution; and so forth. 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) adds a new dimension to both 
the dichotomy about the type of accountability mechanism to be used and the dichotomy about 
the goals such mechanisms should pursue. With regard to mechanisms, now that the ICC exists 
some argue that, at least in some cases, anything less than an international trial is inadequate, 
even though the ICC is likely never to try more than a small number of perpetrators. With 
regard to goals, the ICC, as a criminal court, seems to be built along the classic criminal justice 
model, but to the extent that its ambitions include some of the broader aims of transitional jus-
tice and human rights, there may be some tension. 
Thus, as these various mechanisms have evolved, we see tensions involving the blurring of 
both the types of mechanisms to be pursued and the appropriate goals of accountability 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. 
I See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AJlL 295 (2003). 
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mechanisms, and how (if at all) both the various types and the various goals might be har-
monized to work together. This panel will explore these questions. 
First, we will hear from David Luban, who will address the first dichotomy, arguing against 
the idea that only international courts can provide appropriate accountability for atrocities. 
Instead, he will tell several "folktales of justice," to use Robert Cover's famous phrase,2 in 
order to argue for what he calls universal vigilante jurisdiction. Going back to the very defi-
nition of what it means to commit a crime against humanity, Luban argues that any state could 
seek to redress such crimes. 
Next, we will hear from Allison Danner, who will address the second dichotomy, noting some 
ofthe consequences that arise from the competing goals of postconflict justice. For example, 
the human rights and transitional justice model might be seen as in tension with the individual 
criminal accountability model. She will speak about that tension and argue that the values of 
individual criminal responsibility ought to take precedence in any criminal proceeding, whether 
domestic, international, or presumably hybrid, but particularly in international trials, which 
may be more susceptible to being captured by concerns beyond classic criminal justice. 
Then we will have two case studies from two people who have been actual participants in 
accountability mechanisms: first, Judge Patricia Wald, formerly a federal judge on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and on the ICTY, and now at the Open Society Institute; 
and second Bill Schabas, a professor at the National University of Ireland and currently a 
member of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Judge Wald will discuss why the ICTY model likely will not be repeated and offer some 
conclusions about the role the ICC might play, particularly in relation to other accountability 
mechanisms. Professor Schabas will discuss the relationship between the truth commission in 
Sierra Leone and the hybrid court there. Thus, he will in a sense address both dichotomies by 
looking at the relationship between two accountability mechanisms that have different aims and 
are being played out in different forums. His is thus a useful concluding paper for the panel. 
FOLKTALES OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
by David Luban' 
When Laura Dickinson asked me to participate on this panel, she very nicely said that she 
hoped I could bring a different perspective to the discussion. I thought I knew what she meant. 
The other panelists share a profound knowledge of how international criminal-law institutions 
work. My "different perspective" would therefore be the perspective of abject ignorance. 
Taking comfort from the Socratic dictum that there is wisdom in knowing what you do not 
know, I accepted the invitation because it gives me the opportunity to pose questions rather 
than proposing answers. I will raise my questions by examining some stories-what the late 
Robert Cover called Folktales of Justice-about the nature of legal institutions, in order to 
tease out some understanding of their aims. l It is, after all, folktales and myths (even more than 
arguments) that reflect the moral intuitions that stand at the base of all legal institutions. 
The first is a nonmythic, entirely true-to-life story: It is well-known that in the wake of the 
Armenian genocide of 1915, the Allies originally hoped to put its perpetrators on trial for 
violating "the laws of humanity." The project was scuttled in the face of American objections 
2 See Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173 (Martha Minow et al. eds. 1992) . 
• Frederick Haas Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I Robert S. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds. 1992). 
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that the laws of humanity are entirely too vague to form appropriate predicates for criminal 
trials. In 1921, an Armenian survivor named Tehlirian gunned down the main organizer of the 
genocide on the streets of Berlin. Tehlirian was only seventeen years old then and he lived until 
1979. Last semester, a law student emailed me a photograph of Tehlirian's tomb, which-
oddly-is in Fresno, California. The inscription reads, in English and Armenian: "This monu-
ment has been erected by the Armenian people in memory ofSoghomon Tehlirian, the national 
hero who on March 15, 1921, brought justice upon Talaat Pasha, a principal Turkish perpetrator 
of the Armenian genocide of 1915, which claimed the lives of 1,500,000 Armenian martyrs." If 
the law will not bring justice, the monument seems to say, then justice will fall to vigilantes like 
Tehlirian, or Shmuel Schwartzband, the young Jew who gunned down the orchestrator ofthe 1919 
Ukrainian pogroms on the streets of Paris, five years after Tehlirian killed Talaat Pasha. 
Justice, on this view, amounts to accountability and punishment. Ifstates find accountability 
and punishment too inconvenient to deliver, vigilantes will rightly take justice into their own 
hands. Grotius wrote that an "open and conspicuous" punishment, which "may deter others 
from the commission of the same crimes ... may be inflicted by any ... individual."2 "A vin-
dictive punishment," he adds, "inflicted by an injured individual or any other person ... has 
nothing unlawful in it, considering the law of nature by itself."J 
According to Samantha Power, the assassination of Talaat Pasha piqued the interest of a 
twenty-one-year-old law student named Raphael Lemkin, who wondered why legal punishment 
had never fallen on the murderers of the Armenians. In Lemkin's bewildered words, "It is a 
crime for Tehlirian to kill a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a mil-
lion men? This is most inconsistent.'>! That observation launched Lemkin's incredible career, 
which, as we all know, led him to coin the word "genocide," to define it and theorize it, and to 
lobby for the General Assembly resolution against genocide and the Convention Against Geno-
cide. In a sense, Tehlirian's thirst for accountability, channeled through Lemkin's passion, 
stands at the fountainhead of the international criminal law project as we know it today. The 
project, this story suggests, arises not from statecraft but from what Grotius thinks is a more 
basic and primitive source: vigilante jurisdiction. Vigilantism delivers accountability in its pur-
est, most unvarnished, form. 5 
Whose vigilantism, however? For Lemkin, genocide is a universal crime, a "crime against 
the human status" (to quote the Nuremberg prosecutor Franyois de Menthon) which offends 
against all humankind. The phrase "crimes against humanity" likewise signifies crimes that of-
fend against the human status and that all humankind shares an interest in repressing. The same 
is true of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions: although the Conventions do not say so 
explicitly, they too are universal crimes. 
That implies that anyone might have murdered Talaat Pasha or the Ukranian pogromist Petliura. 
But of course, "anyone" did not. It was an Armenian who murdered Talaat and a Jew who 
killed Petliura. And it was what Tehlirian's tomb calls "the Armenian people," or some subset 
of them, that erected the monument to Tehlirian. Humanity erected no such tomb. The student 
who sent me the photo was, you will not be surprised to learn, of Armenian descent. No one 
but Armenians visits Tehlirian's tomb. 
Already, we can hear a question that animates the decision between international and uni-
versal-jurisdiction tribunals, on the one hand, and territorial tribunals on the other. The question 
is: Who holds the right to punish? In Grotius's terms, is it "the injured individual" or "any other 
person"? When German passersby tackled Tehlirian after the shooting, he shouted in broken 
2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE [DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS] 228, bk. II, ch. 20, sec. VII (A.C. 
Campbell trans., 1901). 
3Id. 
4 SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 17 (2002). 
5 I develop these ideas in David Luban, A Theory a/Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J.INT'L L. 85, 124-40 
(2004). 
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German that he and Talaat were both foreigners, so "it's nothing to do with yoU.,,6 Who was 
right, Tehlirian or Lemkin and Grotius? They, after all, believed that Talaat Pasha's crime has 
everything to do with everyone. 
Vigilantism is not an idea that sits comfortably with an audience of lawyers. Crucially, 
Grotius recognizes that the accountability project cannot be left in the hands of vigilantes. He 
writes: "as our judgment is apt to be biased ... judges have been appointed, whereby the natu-
ral liberty of personal redress, originally allowed to individuals, was abolished, or at least 
abridged.,,7 The vigilante jurisdiction must be delegated to the state. 
Consider a second story, Ariel Dorfinan' s powerful drama of transitional justice, Death and 
the Maiden. Paulina, a torture victim of the Pinochet dictatorship, manages to capture the man 
she believes raped her during her captivity. She holds him at gunpoint and demands that he 
confess. Her husband, a prominent human rights lawyer who has just been appointed to the new 
Truth Commission, is appalled at the thought that Paulina might kill him. Paulina was blind-
folded during her torture and she recognizes the man only by his voice. Her husband warns, "A 
vague memory ofsomeone's voice is not proof of anything, Paulina .... What can he confess 
ifhe's innocent?" To which she replies, bluntly: "Ifhe's innocent? Then he's really screwed."g 
For obvious reasons, that answer seems totally unacceptable. As Grotius suggests, the aim of 
tribunals is not simply to create accountability, but equally to protect innocent suspects from 
justice-seekers.9 
That insight is inherent as well in a third folktale of justice, this time one of humanity's pri-
mordial myths of the origin of punishment. In the Bible, after Cain commits the world's first 
murder, against his brother Abel, God punishes Cain with banishment. "[Y]our brother's blood 
cries to Me from the ground. Therefore you shall be more cursed than the ground, which opened 
its mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand .... You shall become a ceaseless 
wanderer on earth.,,1Q Cain's homicide makes him unfit to inhabit society; God therefore re-
moves him from society. Interestingly, in the first murder case ever, God does not impose 
capital punishment. 
But Cain immediately recognizes the problem inherent in his exile: "[A ]nyone who meets me 
may kill me."ll When organized society withdraws its protection, he becomes fair game for 
vigilantes. And the vigilantes will punish him even more harshly than what God has deemed 
a just punishment: they will inflict death where God proclaimed only exile. So God reassures 
Cain: He will carry a mark signifying that whoever kills him will suffer sevenfold punishment. 
Implicit in the story is a critique of vigilantism. Vigilantes cannot be counted on to deliver 
just punishment; even criminals have to be protected against them. Vigilantes may deliver dis-
proportionate punishment, as in the Cain and Abel story; or they may punish the innocent, as 
Paulina's confession that if the doctor is innocent he's really screwed suggests. Hence the 
second question addressed by today's panel: Which form of tribunal can best be counted on to 
fulfill the precepts of natural justice, warding off unjust or excessive punishment? 
There is another problem with vigilantism, and more generally with the quest for account-
ability that vigilantism represents: not the problem of unjust punishment, but the problem of 
endless vendetta. Here the archetype is Aeschylus' Eumenides, the final play ofthe Oresteian 
trilogy. The play offers literature's most famous myth ofthe origin of the legal system. You will 
recall the story: King Agamemnon has killed his own daughter in response to a prophecy. In 
revenge, his wife Clytemnestra murders Agamemnon. In turn their son Orestes takes vengeance 
6 POWER, supra note 4, at I. 
7 GROTlUS, supra note 2. 
8 ARIEL DORFMAN, DEATH AND THE MAIDEN, act I, sc. 4; act 2, sc. I. 
9 See David Luban, On Dorfman's Death and the Maiden, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 115 (1998). 
10 Gen. 4: I 0-12 (Jewish Publication Society trans., 1992). 
!lId. at 4:14. 
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by murdering his mother. At that point, the Furies-the primordial goddesses of revenge-
pursue Orestes for his crime. He flees to Athens, where the goddess Athena sets up a trial, the 
first ever, over whether their pursuit is right. The Furies argue their own case, and Apollo 
represents Orestes. 
The legal issue they debate is which is worse, the murder of a father or of a mother? Apollo, 
a divine sexist, insists that murdering a father is worse, so that Orestes was right to avenge it. 
The Furies side with the right of mothers. The jury divides evenly. Athena, far from a neutral, 
impartial judge, breaks the tie, declaring that she is "for the male with all my soul.,,12 She per-
suades the Furies to give up the accountability project and instead become protectresses of the 
city. The Areopagite court takes over the Furies' profession. Law interrupts the cycle ofven-
geance and retribution, and the chorus underlines the point. It prays that the dry dust should 
never drink "the blood of citizens through passion for revenge and bloodshed for bloodshed.,,13 
Strikingly, even though Aeschylus obviously likes the outcome, he makes it clear that the 
Furies lost their case only because Apollo and Athena cheated. It was the Furies who had estab-
lished law on their side. As I read the story, its fundamental message is that breaking the cycle 
of vengeance is more important than holding the guilty accountable, that legal systems exist not 
so much to do justice as to water it down in the name of peace and order. 14 Legal systems, 
Aeschylus seems to say, always generate an accountability deficit-and they always should. If 
they did not, the dry dust would be soaked forever with the blood of citizens. 
The questions this insight leaves us with are obvious. First, are peace and justice the only 
alternatives? Second, is peace really more important than justice? Third, if it is, what becomes 
of the world's Paulinas? Today, ten years after the genocide, do Rwandan rape victims truly 
have to live a hundred yards from their rapists? And fourth, is the role of states and the inter-
national society of states to create accountability or to dilute it? 
Let us go back through the stories to see what they tell us about the goals of tribunals. The 
story of Tehlirian and Lemkin points to the goal most obvious in the project of international 
criminal law: accountability. But accountability is not the only goal. The Cain and Abel story, 
like Death and the Maiden, reveals a second, perhaps equally important goal: protection of 
suspects. The Oresteia proposes a third goal: peace, even at the cost of accountability. 
The stories, if we take them seriously, tell us even more, however. If Aeschylus is right, 
creating accountability for slaughter is not really an interest of states; nor is it obviously an 
interest of the international society of states. 15 Few today, indeed, should deny that states are 
only lukewarm about the accountability project. They condemn universal crimes in the abstract 
but they seldom intervene to stop them. Nor should we overlook that only two of the world's 
ten most populous states have ratified the Treaty of Rome, and the states-parties represent less 
than halfthe world's popUlation. 
On the other hand, ifLemkin and Grotius are right, even if states settle for an accountability 
deficit, human beings should not. Human beings, not states, share an interest in repressing the 
great crimes against the human status. That interest is, fundamentally, a vigilante jurisdiction. 
It is less clear, however, whether all human beings share the penal interest, or if Tehlirian was 
right that it is a matter for the victim's community only. That is perhaps the key question for 
today's panel. Finally, Dorfman's cautionary drama, like the primordial story of Cain and Abel, 
offers a criterion to judge the legitimacy of tribunals-any tribunals, international, domestic, 
or third-party: the extent to which they offer the protections of natural justice for the defendants 
they judge. Provided they meet that criterion, at bottom any court might do. 
12 AEscHYLUS, Eumenides, in AESCHYLUS I: ORESTEIA 169, 11. 737-38 (Richard Lattimore trans., 1953). 
13 /d., 11. 979-82. 
14 I elaborate on this interpretation in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 298-321 (1994). This is a revised version 
of David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer. Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REv. 
279 (1987). 
" See Luban, supra note 5, at 124-37. 
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JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
by Allison Marston Danner' 
As the title of this panel suggests, debates about accountability for mass atrocities often 
center on selection of the appropriate legal forum, whether that be an international tribunal, a 
hybrid tribunal, a truth commission, or a domestic prosecution. Despite this dizzying array of 
options, all these proceedings share one important principle: each relies-at least in part--on 
international criminal law as its source of substantive law. While hybrid and domestic trials 
may also include charges drawn from domestic criminal codes, all of the major institutions 
established in the past ten years to address past atrocities include within their jurisdiction 
crimes originating from international criminal law. 1 This propagation of international criminal 
law renders its past and future development a critical concern. 
International criminal law is a complex body oflaw that defies easy categorization. It can be 
understood as a direct outgrowth of international humanitarian law.2 International criminal law 
has also been described as a hybrid body oflaw employing principles drawn from the civil and 
common law modes of criminal adjudication.3 These portrayals, however accurate, are incom-
plete. They fail to capture other influences-namely domestic criminal law, human rights law, 
and transitional justice principles-that have played, and continue to play, an important role 
in the development of contemporary international criminal law. 
My remarks here summarize a larger project undertaken with Professor Jenny Martinez.4 Our 
project has two principal goals: First, it describes the distinguishing features of the criminal 
law, human rights, and transitional justice influences that we believe shape contemporary 
international criminal law. It then applies those influences to two key liability doctrines within 
international criminal law: joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility. My remarks 
here do not attempt to describe the project in its entirety; instead, they briefly set out our vision 
ofthe major influences shaping international criminal law and their application to the doctrine 
of joint criminal enterprise. 
Describing international criminal law as a confluence of principles drawn from domestic 
criminal law, human rights, and transitional justice principles may be seen as reductive. To 
some extent, the categories overlap. International human rights law, for example, includes 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
I Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 5-8 (genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes), UN Doc. NCONF .183/9*( 1998), reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998), corrected through May 8. 2000. 
by UN Doc. CN.177.2000.TREATIES-5; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, arts. 2-4 (crimes against 
humanity and war crimes), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/; Regulation No. 2000115 on the Establishment of Panels 
with Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Serious Criminal Offences, sec. 1.3, UNT AETlReg/2000/15 (June 6, 2000) (East 
Timor) (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), available at <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetRi 
RegOO 15E.pdt>; Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea art. 9 
(genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) (Mar. 17, 2003), available at <http://www.yale.edulcgp/ 
Cambodia%20DraftOIo20Agreement%20 17-03-03.doc>; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia arts. 2-5 (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), in Report of the Secretary-General Pursu-
ant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S125704 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1159 
(1993), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm> [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, arts. 2-4 (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), SC Res. 955, 
annex, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 15, UN Doc. SIINF/50 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1598 (1994), 
available at <http://www.ictr.orglENGLISHJbasicdocs/statute.html> [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
2 The statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, for example, call for the prosecution of "serious violations of international 
humanitarian law." ICTY Statute, supra note I, art. I; ICTR Statute, supra note I, art. L 
3 See. e.g .. Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance ofConsid-
ering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the International Criminal 
Court. 6 UCLAJ.INT'L L. & FOREIGN. AFF. 391 (2001); Faiza Patel King & Anne-Marie laRosa, Jurisprudence of 
the Yugoslavia Tribunal: 1994-1996. 8 EUR. JINT'L L. 123, 125 (1997). 
4 See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise. Command 
Responsibility. and the Development of International Criminal Law. 93 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Jan. 2005). 
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principles governing the criminal trial, and the criminal trial is an important element of tran-
sitionaljustice mechanisms. Nevertheless, certain essential features of each of these approaches 
can be distilled and compared. 
Domestic criminalla~ focuses on individual wrongdoing as a necessary prerequisite to the 
imposition of criminal punishment. The criminal trial centers on the mental state and actions 
of the perpetrator: the experience of the victim is, in important ways, peripheral to the search 
for criminal wrongdoing. International criminal adjudication has implicitly, and occasionally 
explicitly, adopted this orientation.6 International criminal law instantiates this focus on indi-
vidual wrongdoing through a variety of substantive and procedural devices.? At bottom, how-
ever, these doctrines simply reinforce the principle of individual culpability and the concomitant 
avoidance of guilt by association. 
By contrast, human rights proceedings are, generally speaking, centered on the wrongs in-
flicted on the victim. The substantive norms of international human rights law are often broadly 
interpreted to ensure that harms to victims are recognized and remedied, and that over time 
progressively greater respect for human dignity and freedom is realized.8 In many human rights 
proceedings, the culpability of the individual wrongdoer is relatively unimportant. Indeed, 
establishing the identity of the individual wrongdoer may not be necessary in order to find that 
the victim's human rights have been violated.9 
In contrast to criminal and human rights law, "transitional justice" does not refer to a body 
of substantive law but instead to a variety of legal mechanisms used to mark political tran-
sitions. 1O The proceedings may consist, for example, of criminal trials, truth commissions, or 
indigenous mechanisms. I I Because oftheir political function, these proceedings share common 
elements. They seek to provide a historical record of a period; often truth-telling is a primary 
goal. Generally they also seek to establish that individuals-not entire societies-are respon-
sible for the wrongs of the past. 12 In practice, these mechanisms often attribute responsibility 
for past wrongdoing to the political leaders of the period. 
It is our contention that these three influences-sketched briefly here-play an important role 
in the development of many doctrines of contemporary international criminal law, including 
joint criminal enterprise. Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is a theory ofliability that has been 
most extensively elaborated by the prosecutors and judges at the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). \3 JCE allows individuals to be convicted of crimes 
that they did not physically commit. Although JCE has several variants, it essentially requires 
, By this phrase, I refer to certain general features common to most sophisticated municipal criminal law systems, 
particularly the principle of individual culpability. See MiIjan Damaska, The Shadow Side o/Command Respon-
sibility, 49 AM. J. COMPo L. 455, 470 (2001). 
6 Prosecutor V. Tadic, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-I-A para. 186 (July 15,1999) [hereinafter 
Tadic V] (stating "The basic assumption must be that in intemationallaw as much as in national systems, the 
foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally re-
sponsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated"). 
7 The rule of strict construction of penal statutes represents one such device. See, e.g., Prosecutor V. Kayishema 
& Ruzindana, Judgement, Trial Chamber, Case No. ICTR-95-I-T para. 103. 
8 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832, 1887 (2002). In criminal law trials, 
by contrast, the offenses are, at least in theory, strictly construed in favor of the defendant. 
9 See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgement, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. C), No.4, para. 172 (1988). 
10 See generally, RUT! G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (200 I); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz, ed. 1997). 
II The gacaca proceedings used in Rwanda, for example, provide an example of such an indigenous mechanism. 
See Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology 0/ International Crime, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 263, 275 
(2003). 
12 See Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1,6 (1998). 
13 Joint criminal enterprise is also referred to by other terms, such as "common purpose" and "common plan" lia-
bility. See Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momar Talic, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and 
Prosecution Application to Amend, June 26,2001, para. 24, 2001 WL 1793829. 
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prosecutors to prove that a group of people had a common plan, design, or purpose to commit 
a crime; that the defendant participated in some fashion in the common plan; and that the de-
fendant intended the object of the common plan. 14 If the prosecution can prove these elements, 
the defendant can be convicted of all completed crimes within the scope of the common plan, and 
all crimes that he did not intend but that were a foreseeable consequence of the common plan. 
Joint criminal enterprise does not appear in the statute of the ICTY. It was recognized by the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber as implicitly falling within the statute in part based on the Appeals 
Chamber's reading of the statute's object and purpose, which it described as ensuring that "all 
those who have engaged in serious violations of international humanitarian law, whatever the 
manner in which they may have been perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration of those 
violations, must be brought to justice.,,15 
It is our contention that the development of joint criminal enterprise bears indications of the 
importance of criminal law, human rights, and transitional justice principles in contemporary 
international criminal law. With reference to the criminal law paradigm, we note assertions by 
the ICTY judiciary that JCE is a form of individual liability. 16 This requirement is doctrinally 
enforced through the twin requirements that the individual must intend the criminal object of 
the joint criminal enterprise and must participate in some way in the accomplishment of that 
objective. From the human rights approach, we observe the willingness ofthe ICTY Appeals 
Chamber to go beyond the text of the statute and adopt this far-reaching theory. The language 
of Tadic suggests that the Appeals Chamber decision arose from a victim-centered search for 
accountability that seeks to ensure that all perpetrators may be found guilty of crimes within 
the ICTY's jurisdiction. From transitional justice, we find there is an emphasis on using JCE 
to prosecute the senior leadership. Siobodan Milosevic, for example, stands accused of par-
ticipating in three massive JCES.17 Furthermore,joint criminal enterprise allows individuals to 
be found responsible for broad swaths of wrongdoing, which arguably furthers the transitional 
justice goal of disclosing the full extent of crimes perpetrated in the names of former leaders. 
While these three influences can be observed in the development ofjoint criminal enterprise, 
the doctrine has in practice strayed far from the focus on individual culpability that distin-
guishes the criminal law paradigm. Because there is usually no minimum quantum of contri-
bution an individual must make to a JCE, international prosecutors can allege joint criminal 
enterprises of enormous scope. There appears to be no reason, for example, why the ICTR Pros-
ecutor could not allege that the elimination of moderate Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda was itself 
the object of a massive criminal enterprise. Through this charge, the prosecution could argue 
that each ICTR defendant who intentionally participated in the genocide and who foresaw the 
killings that in fact occurred should be found liable for the murder of hundreds of thousands 
of people. 
In practice, JCE represents an enormous transfer of power from international judges to prose-
cutors, who have enormous discretion to decide how much wrongdoing to tie to any particular 
defendant. Because the doctrine is so loose, JCE approaches dangerously close to guilt by asso-
ciation. This is particularly troubling in light of the still-tenuous legitimacy of international 
criminal law. 
Joint criminal enterprise also illustrates the potential dangers posed by the proliferation of 
international criminal law. Substantive international criminal law is used in many forums, 
14 See Prosecutor v. Multinovic et ai., Decision on Dragoljub Ojdani~'s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint 
Criminal Enterprise. Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72 (May 21,2003). 
IS Tadic V, supra note 6, para. 190. 
16 See, e.g,. Prosecutor v. Multinovic et ai., supra note 14, para. 26. 
17 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Initial Indictment, Case No. IT-O 1-51-1 para. 6 (Nov. 22, 200 I) Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 
First Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-02-54-T para. 6 (Oct. 23,2002); Prosecutor v. Milosevic et ai., Second 
Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-99-37-PT para. 16 (Oct. 16,2001). 
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international and national, and the complementarity regime of the International Criminal Court 
should only accelerate this trend. Not all these forums will share the human rights and trans-
itionaljustice goals of the original courts in which the doctrine may have been developed. Two 
indictments recently issued by the United States Military Commissions established to try 
alleged terrorists, for example, appear to employ a version of joint criminal enterprise. 
These indictments accuse two individuals of conspiracy to commit a variety of crimes, in-
cluding attacking civilians, by ''willfully and knowingly join[ing] an enterprise of persons who 
shared a common criminal purpose.,,18 Human rights advocates may applaud when an inter-
national court uses an expansive version of JCE doctrine to hold a particular defendant liable 
for the range of crimes associated with regional ethnic cleansing in which he played some part. 
But they may wish the doctrine had been more carefully defined when it is later used by a 
national government to suggest that all persons who provide any sort of support to a terrorist 
organization, however loosely defined, become liable for all crimes committed by its members. 
We hope that international judges and prosecutors will be sensitive to the influences that may 
guide their decision-making. We believe that not all these principles are equally suitable for 
forums premised on a criminal law mode that promises to adjudicate individual criminal re-
sponsibility. In the case of joint criminal enterprise, the influence of human rights and transi-
tional justice principles may have gone too far. 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS WORKING IN PARALLEL: 
THE SIERRA LEONE EXPERIENCE 
by William A. Schabas' 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in July 2002, 
pursuant to an act of the country's Parliament. 1 It is expected to present its final report to the 
president of Sierra Leone in June 2004. The report will provide Sierra Leone with a detailed 
narrative of the country's history, focusing on the brutal civil war of the 1990s; analysis of vari-
ous dimensions of political, economic and social life, with a view to understanding the causes 
of the conflict; and a series of [mdings and recommendations. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of post-conflict justice in Sierra Leone is the parallel exis-
tence of a truth commission and an international tribunal, the Special Court of Sierra Leone. 
Traditionally, truth and reconciliation commissions have been viewed as an alternative to crimi-
nal justice that, sometimes only informally, replaces or at the very least suspends prosecutions. 
In Sierra Leone, the two institutions have operated contemporaneously. 
This unprecedented experiment has revealed some ofthe tensions that may exist between the 
two approaches. Yet it has also demonstrated the feasibility of the simultaneous operation of 
an international court and a truth commission. The Sierra Leone experience may help us under-
stand that post-conflict justice requires a sometimes complex mix of synergistic therapies, 
rather than a unique choice of one approach from a list of what some may see as essentially 
incompatible alternatives. 
Sierra Leone's civil war began on March 23, 1991, when forces styling themselves the Revo-
lutionary United Front (RUF) raided the town of Bombali, which is near the northern border 
18 United States v. Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al Qosi, Charge: Conspiracy para. 18 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at 
<http://www.defenselink.millnewslFeb2004/d20040224AlQosi.pdi>;UnitedStatesv.AliHarnza Ahmad Sulayman 
al Bahlul, Charge: Conspiracy para. 14 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at <http://www.defenselink.millnewslFeb2004/ 
d20040224AI Bahlul.pdi>. . 
• Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway, and Director, Irish Centre for Human 
Rights, and a member of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This article is written in his private 
capacity; it does not necessarily reflect the views of the other commissioners or of the Commission. 
I Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Supplement to the 131 SIERRA LEONE GAZETIE , No.9. 
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with Liberia. The fonnal beginning of the end of the conflict was the Lome Peace Agreement 
of July 7, 1999, between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.2 The agreement pro-
vided a controversial amnesty for perpetrators of atrocities on all sides of the conflict. 3 The 
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Francis Okelo, fonnu-
lated a reservation to the amnesty provision, insisting that it could not apply to crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.4 
The Lome Peace Agreement pledged the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (TRC or Commission), to be set up within ninety days. Although efforts were soon 
directed to this task,5 legislation for the purpose was not adopted by Sierra Leone's Parliament 
until February 22,2000. Pursuant to section 6(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Act 2000, the Sierra Leone TRC was established 
to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law related to the anned conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning 
of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement; to address impunity, 
to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent 
a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.6 
A renewal of fighting in May 2000 stalled the creation of the TRC and also revived debate 
about the legitimacy of the amnesty. Responding to a request from the government of Sierra 
Leone, on August 14, 2000, the Security Council supported the creation of a court to try 
"persons who bear the greatest responsibility" for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law and the laws of Sierra Leone and mandated the Secretary-General to negotiate an 
agreement with the government of Sierra Leone to this effect.7 
The two organizations-the TRC and the Special Court-both became operational in mid-
2002. After a start-up phase that lasted several months, the Commission's actual activities 
began in December 2002. During a three-month statement-taking phase, approximately seven 
thousand victims and perpetrators were interviewed in all comers of the country. The detailed 
statements that emerged were used to identifY "window cases" that became the focus of public 
hearings. The hearings phase started in April 2003 and concluded in early August with an 
appearance by the president of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. 
In March 2003, the Special Court issued eight indictments against several obvious and well-
known suspects, including fonner RUF leader Foday Sankoh, fonner junta leader Johnny Paul 
Koroma, incumbent deputy defense minister Sam Hinga Nonnan, and erstwhile Liberian Presi-
dent Charles Taylor. N onnan had been expected to meet with the TRC only days before he was 
arrested and detained. Since then, trial preparations have been underway and a variety of pre-
liminary procedural matters have been litigated. The first trials began in June 2004. The TRC 
is expected to present its report by October 2004. 
In a letter to the Security Council in 2001, as the court's legal framework was still being 
negotiated, Kofi Annan said that "care must be taken to ensure that the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will operate in a complementary and 
2 For discussion ofthe legal status of the agreement, see Prosecutor v. Kallon et aI., Case Nos. SCSL-2004-l5 and 
l6-AR 72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction (Lome Accord Amnesty) (Mar. 13, 2004). 
3 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 
Lome, Togo (July 7,1999), art. IX. 
4 Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. 
S/1999/836 (July 30, 1999). 
5 Richard Bennett, The Evolution of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in UNAMSIL, TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION IN SIERRA LEONE 37-51 (2001). 
6 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, available at <httpll:www. sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>. 
7 UN Doc. S/RES/2000/1315. On the establishment of the Court, see Prosecutor v. Kallon et aI., supra note 2, 
Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction (Mar. 13,2004). 
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mutually supportive manner, fully respectful of their distinct but related functions. ,,8 Once it 
became clear that the two institutions would operate in parallel, there was intense speculation 
about how they might interact. Those who were suspicious of truth commissions and oriented 
towards criminal prosecution saw an opportunity to marginalize the TRC, subordinating it to 
the court as a kind of investigative arm or grand jury. Those who favored restorative justice 
approaches responded by insisting upon the relevance of a strong and dynamic TRC as a com-
plement to prosecution. Several nongovernmental organizations made detailed submissions 
directed at a formal "relationship agreement" between the two bodies. 
The various proposals mainly attempted to govern the modalities of information sharing 
between the TRC and the Special Court. In practice everyone understood this would be a one-
way street. It was quite unthinkable that the prosecutor of the Special Court-not to mention 
the defense-would share its files with the Commission. From the TRC standpoint, the concern 
was that access by the court to its materials would have a chilling effect on perpetrators who 
might otherwise have been tempted to cooperate with the Commission. For example, the Secre-
tary-General indicated that the RUF was "receptive" to the TRC but that it had expressed "con-
cern over the independence of the Commission and the relationship between it and the Special 
Court.,,9 According to Human Rights Watch, doubts about the ability of the TRC to obtain 
information in confidence "could potentially undermine the willingness of persons to come 
before the TRC to provide testimony."lo 
In the end, there was never any agreement between the two bodies; nor was there any infor-
mation-sharing. Neither institution showed any interest in cooperation. Both seemed to value 
polite, neighborly relations, nothing more. The prosecutor of the Special Court, David Crane, 
very helpfully declared that he was not interested in seeking information from the TRC, a move 
that may have reassured some perpetrators who were concerned that any information they might 
provide to the Commission would be used to build a case against them at the Special Court. 
After the TRC concluded its public hearings in August 2003, some detainees of the Special 
Court asked to give public testimony to the TRC. Even more surprisingly, the Prosecutor then 
opposed the initiatives taken by the TRC with a view to facilitating such public hearings. A 
ruling by the court's president, Geoffrey Robertson, allowed defendants to appear before the 
Commission but did not authorize a public hearing. II Deprived of the platform they had been 
seeking, the defendants ultimately refused to cooperate with the TRC. Unfortunately, the 
tensions generated by this litigation left a sour taste in relations between the TRC and the 
Special Court. In reality, it was little more than an incident in what had been an essentially 
serene relationship. 
The TRC accomplished its mandate, although it suffered terribly from poor funding and 
administrative weaknesses. In particular, it was able to prompt the cooperation of many perpe-
trators, who testified to their deeds in public or private. In this respect, it was probably no better 
or worse than the many other truth commissions have been. There is nothing simple about 
convincing those who have committed atrocities to admit to their crimes. Moreover, the Sierra 
Leone TRC did not have the carrot of amnesty that the South African TRC had used as an 
incentive for perpetrator admissions. 
8 Letter dated January 12, 200 I from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2001/40, para. 9. 
9 Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/20011857 
(Sept. 7, 200 I), para. 44. 
10 Human Rights Watch Policy Paper on the Interrelationship Between the Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (April 18,2002), at 2. See also Letter from PRIDE to ICTJ, quoted in Marieke 
Wierda et aI., Exploring the Relationship Between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Sierra Leone, International Center for Transitional Justice paper (June 24, 2002), at 8. 
II Prosecutor v. Nonnan (Case No. SCSL-2003-08-pn, Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for Sierra Leone ('TRC' or 'The Commission') and Chief Samuel Hinga Nonnan JP Against the 
Decision of His Lordship, Mr Justice Bankole Thompson, Delivered on October 30, 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request 
to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Nonnan JP, Nov. 28, 2003. 
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The willingness or reluctance of perpetrators to participate in accountability processes-be 
they truth commissions or courts-may have far less to do with promises of amnesty or threats 
of prosecution than many may think. Just as criminals often confess despite Miranda warnings 
about the right to silence, not to mention stern admonition from their lawyers, some perpe-
trators of serious human rights violations may feel the need to unburden themselves, to "tock 
dee troot" as they say in Krio, Sierra Leone's lingua franca. At the other extreme, there are those 
who are incapable of admitting to what they have done even when promised immunity from 
prosecution. This suggests that whether truth-telling does or does not work is unrelated to the 
threat of criminal trial. 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES: 
WHAT ROLES FOR NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND HYBRID TRIBUNALS? 
by Patricia M Wale! 
The past ten years have seen an extremely fast-moving scenario in the introduction, revision, 
and possibly the rejection of individual accountability mechanisms for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. In rapid succession (rapid at least for this line of work) we have seen the 
establishment of two United Nations Article VII Security-Council-based courts (Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda), several hybrid courts (Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia) meld-
ing national and international judges and law; some largely unsuccessful attempts by national 
courts to go it alone, and a plethora of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)--some 
successful, some not-rejecting or supplementing the criminal law mode for confession and 
community penance. While it may be too early for final verdicts, we have some fairly steady 
indicators of where future courts of this kind may be headed. 
1. 
The first model-the pure UN Court-has proved too costly for its sponsors to repeat. De-
spite formidable achievements in the development of a war crimes and crimes against human-
ity jurisprudence, the trials in these courts have been unduly slow (though faster in recent years 
with the introduction of negotiated guilty pleas and other procedural reforms); Rwanda has 
suffered additionally from spates of corruption in its administration; and neither the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) nor that for Rwanda (the ICTR) 
has made real contact with the populaces affected by their proceedings. They are perceived as 
distant and unconcerned with the effect of their activities upon victims. 
As far as defusing tensions in the region, there is little evidence they have accomplished much. 
Indeed, under this original model the judges have little power to do so; it is the prosecutor who 
selects the cases (among "big fish" or "little fish" defendants, and among the ethnic warring 
groups). The judges are mainly receptors for the cases that come in over the transom. In at least 
one case at the ICTY the judges openly expressed their unhappiness with the prosecutor's 
choice of cases and refused to remand for a new trial, despite their ruling that the trial court had 
been wrong under the law in dismissing a genocide case. 
I note that in the new International Criminal Court (ICC), Pretrial Chamber judges have more 
power at the edges to affect the choice of cases, which in turn may affect tension in the area. 
They can decide whether a state is capable and willing to prosecute the case itself (Rome 
Statute, art. 19) and that a case "is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court" 
(art. 17); and they can review the prosecutor's decision not to proceed with an investigation 
• Chair, Open Society Justice Initiative; fonner Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugoslavia; 
and fonner Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals. D.C. Circuit. 
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because it "would not serve the interests of justice" (art. 53).1 There are, furthermore, more 
provisions for active participation by victims in the proceedings, as well as the possibility of 
money reparations. All these may have some potential to reduce tension. 
In all types of courts, selection of whom to prosecute and when can be potentially important 
for reducing tension. Indeed, there is a continuing conflict between those who believe criminal 
prosecution "for the sake of justice" is a paramount consideration at all times and those who 
believe that declining to prosecute, or even guaranteeing amnesty, may under certain conditions 
be a more desirable strategy in negotiating or implementing peace. 
Everyone agrees that international criminal courts operate in an intensely political milieu and 
cannot escape political-in the broadest sense of the word--context in formulating prose-
cutorial strategies; that context may well include prospects for reducing tensions. The tribunals 
have affected events in the political arena. Indictments of former President Karadic meant he 
could no longer run for office or leave the region; the ICTY provided a forum for a new reform 
president of Croatia to reveal the misdeeds of his predecessor and also affected Milosevic' s 
control over his home country and helped to legitimize the Kosovo interventions. Whatever the 
outcome, the ICTR helped disestablish Charles Taylor; and a tribunal could have a similar 
purging effect in Iraq. 
On the other hand, a recent New York Times article on Mostar, a Bosnian city, ten years after 
the war, says the city has "two sets of nearly everything: hospitals, universities, primary 
schools, public transportation, even waste disposal services."2 Muslims and Croats do every-
thing separately from the Serbs. The international administrator, Lord Ashdown, has tried to 
end this segregation by fiat but the success of his efforts is in doubt. "Most Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats are not loyal to this country," a Sarajevo columnist opines. "They do not have 
the feeling that they belong to this state. Serbs look over the Orina to Belgrade, and Croats to 
Zagreb; foreigners don't understand that." Recent ethnic outbreaks in Kosovo between Serbs 
and Albanians send a similar message. 
II. 
Outreach efforts at all of the international courts so far appear to be primitive. The ICTY is 
gearing up for a more sophisticated program of discussions of specific completed cases in the 
actual localities involved, with the participants, prosecutors, and judges explaining the reasons 
for their actions. In Sierra Leone, the prosecutor made one-on-one efforts to contact people in 
the community before the trials began. In some countries, like Cambodia, where an Extra-
ordinary Chamber is expected to begin next year, the majority of the population does not have 
television or cannot read, so alternative media like radio and street dramas are being con-
sidered. But there is widespread agreement that the role ofthe courts in vindicating past wrongs 
and bringing closure to victims is not being adequately plumbed by any existing court. In one 
sense, we do not really know what effect a vigorous outreach program to explain the tribunals' 
activities and their implications could have on tension reduction. 
III. 
There appears to be widespread agreement, after a decade of trial and error, that courts con-
ducted inside the country where the atrocities took place are most likely to satisfy the involved 
populace's desire for justice, if ... There are many big "ifs" here. Physical security of judges, 
prosecutors, defense counsel, and witnesses is a primary concern. These same players must be 
I Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. AlCONF.183/9* (1998). 
2 Nicholas Wood, Mostar Journal: An Effort to Unify a Bosnian Citie 's Multiple Frictions, N.Y. liMES, Mar. 15, 
2004, atA4. 
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immune from overwhelming pressures from other parts of the national government if the trial 
is to be and to look impartial to the rest of the world as well as the home audience. In several 
nationally held trials, prosecutors have displayed inexplicable docility, witnesses have not been 
protected from intimidation, courtrooms have been filled with noisy and uncontrollable demon-
strators for one side, and adequate resources have been withheld from the judges or court 
administrators. 
Here the Iraq trial could be a trendsetter if properly conducted, showing that a fair trial may 
be held within a country soon after hostilities have ended. But, as I have said, there are many 
ifs. The success of nationally based models is still up in the air, although the ICC's comple-
mentarity principle is substantially based upon it. Finally, if trials are held nationally, there is 
a very significant role for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to monitor them to spot 
injustices and to report to the outside world what is happening. That is why it was especially 
disheartening to hear our own military tribunal had "no room at the inn" for NGOs. 
IV. 
There is a strong sentiment that even if war crimes trials are held in-country, the presence of 
international judges can help to (a) educate local judges on international law and minimal stan-
dards offairness, (b) create an impression of impartiality, and (c) insulate local judges to some 
degree against intimidation from their own governments (the Cambodian law provides that 
there can be no decision without at least one international judge concurring). The Sierra Leone 
and Kosovo tribunals have also employed this mix. Iraq will not have international judges, but 
will have international advisors, which may go some way toward achieving these objectives. 
Again, though, it is not enough to get judges from another country; the visiting judges should 
themselves be schooled in international law and standards. Some have suggested that a core 
group of international judges, and perhaps prosecutors, might rotate on such duties, bringing 
best practices from one tribunal to another. Another interesting suggestion is that in pursuit of 
its complementarity doctrine, the ICC could negotiate and actively assist good-faith national 
authorities in bringing their systems up to snuff so that trials may be held locally. Certainly a 
hybrid international court or a regional court ought to count as part of that system for com-
plementarity purposes. 
It is still not entirely clear whether TRCs could provide the basis for decisions by the ICC 
that complementarity applies, impelling them to decline to hear a case. But the ICC prosecutor 
appears to have adopted an approach of working with local governments to get their systems 
in shape rather than merely fighting offtheir efforts to resist ICC jurisdiction. Hopefully, as the 
ICC gets underway, principles or guidelines as to what constitutes "willing or able" national 
systems will emerge. 
V. 
The role ofthe truth and reconciliation commissions in all ofthis is another work very much 
in progress. Some of these-the prototypes in South Africa and in a few South American coun-
tries-have been very useful in eliciting admissions of responsibility from perpetrators of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. In South Africa, though, the TRC was always backed by the 
threat of prosecution if the perpetrators did not make a full confession; even then it attracted 
mainly middle-level miscreants. In Sierra Leone, where the Special Court and the TRC operated 
simultaneously, the outcomes are reportedly mixed, though Professor Schabas can tell us much 
more. In other countries, TRCs have been feeble or even futile, under-resourced and distrusted. 
The TRC mechanism has much potential, but how best to fit it into a total program for recon-
ciliation is still an open question. My own belief is that it will seldom be enough on its own, 
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but it may offer a constructive alternative for middle- and lower-level offenders when it is 
impossible to bring them all to trial. While it may be necessary to a national sense of justice to 
hold accountable in criminal trials the major instigators and planners of atrocities, for many 
victims it is just as important to face down the local village executor of those nefarious schemes 
and strategies. The varied experiences of the TRCs definitely need more study and experi-
mentation. 
In summary, it may be overoptimistic to expect international prosecutions and trials to recon-
cile as well as punish. They may be a necessary safety valve for collective resentments, but 
after a decade victims know these tribunals cannot give back homes, land, jobs, or lost rela-
tives. Indeed, there is widespread disillusionment with courts generally in most parts of the 
world-their corruption, inefficiency, and impossibility to access. Articulating relatively mod-
est aims for international courts and creating a robust body of international humanitarian law 
for all courts to apply may be the best we can hope for, such as conducting honest trials as an 
example for local systems. They are not, however, the panacea for the world's wars. 
Can reconciliation be possible without much deeper attention to the social and economic 
grievances giving rise to conflict? Most negotiated peaces after civil wars, we are told, end up 
in recurrences within several years, which is when tyrannical governments are most likely to 
come into being. Civil wars are on the rise, while international wars are on the wane; right now 
there are seventeen ethnic-based civil wars. 
Resource shortages plague all international, as well as local, court systems. Voluntary UN 
assessments are an unsteady basis for future international courts. I have been told a global court 
fund is being talked about so these hybrid courts will not have to cut back too soon or too 
drastically from their original goals. 
Hybrid courts and even indigenous mechanisms pose some risks for the traditional orien-
tation of international law that we need to keep in mind. Will these courts apply domestic law 
at all, and will they apply it consistently with other international courts? Will local customary 
law, where it is applied, meet international standards in substance and in procedure? Should 
we care if it does not? Witness the current debate over use of the death penalty in Iraqi trials 
of Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants. 
What does the withdrawal of America from the international court scene, as well as anti-
Americanism in general, mean for the development of international humanitarian law and 
tribunals? Do we as Americans have the moral right to reject putting our citizens before courts 
we do not think are fair? 
So, where are international courts going? Hybrid and regional courts (or indigenous courts) 
will be the trend, sometimes written into the peace treaties themselves. American dominance 
on substance and procedures will lessen. Resources Will continue to be a problem. Hybrid courts 
with some international input will have more credibility if the input is informed. 
The ICC may be a flagship of sorts but will have to pick its way warily between taking on 
hot-button issues and becoming politicized, and avoiding major conflicts and becoming 
irrelevant. Hopefully, the ICC can become a catalyst for beefing up local systems to meet mini-
mal international standards. 
In the end, internationalized courts will fashion a niche for themselves, but how much they 
can aspire to affect fundamental reconciliation, other than assuaging basic senses of injustice 
and ending the impunity of the worst offenders against humanity (not insignificant aims by any 
means), is still unclear at this juncture, as is the comparable effect ofTRCs. 
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